Autonomy inference

Every agent candidate gets an autonomy_level — a static classification of how unattended its side-effecting reach appears to be, derived entirely from signals the scanner already computes. It's always present, regardless of whether declarations exist, the same way capabilities and highest_severity always are.

The ladder

How it's derived

No second taint pass — autonomy inference composes signals the scanner already produces:

• AI002 (a model-output → sink flow) with a side-effecting variant (exec, sql, deserialize, request) means a side-effecting path exists at all. No such finding → recommend_only, immediately.
• AI003 (a high-impact capability, tool-bound, with no approval construct observed) tells the classifier an approval gate is absent. Its absence, combined with an APPROVAL_CONSTRUCT pattern match, tells it a gate is present — AI003 firing means the scanner already concluded no approval was observed, so a stray "approve" elsewhere in the file doesn't count.
• Bounding (new): a hardcoded numeric cap check (if amount > MAX_X) or a rate-limiter construct (the same patterns CTRL003 looks for), searched in the same file as the side-effecting capability. This is a same-file proximity signal, not line-adjacency — deliberately coarse, and documented as such.

# recommend_only — no side-effecting sink
resp = llm.invoke(prompt)
return resp.choices[0].message.content

# human_approved — approval construct observed, AI003 did not fire
if not human_input("approve refund?"):
    return
stripe.Refund.create(payment_intent=order_id, amount=amount)

# bounded_autonomous — cap check, no approval
if amount > MAX_REFUND:
    raise ValueError("too much")
stripe.Refund.create(payment_intent=order_id, amount=amount)

# unrestricted_autonomous — neither
stripe.Refund.create(payment_intent=order_id, amount=amount)

indeterminate is a feature, not a bug

When a side-effecting sink is observed but nothing else correlates — no high-impact capability, no tool binding, no approval, no bounding — the classifier reports indeterminate with a stated reason, rather than defaulting to a level it can't actually justify. A false autonomy classification is worse than an admitted gap: it's exactly the kind of overconfident, unverifiable claim a static scanner should never make. Check autonomy_level.reason for why.

Where it shows up

• stoa-registry.json: agents[].autonomy_level = {level, signals, reason}.
• stoa-report.html: a colored badge on each agent card.
• stoa graph: agent/MCP-server nodes carry autonomy_level in their Mermaid/interactive-graph metadata.
• stoa export --assurance: area 3 (Autonomy), alongside the declared autonomy_intent for comparison — see the contradiction detector for what happens when they disagree.